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DOMCHICK v. GREENBELT
an assumption is a necessity in order to speed the flow of
traffic on our expensive through highways, and through
traffic lights. It seems unlikely that the Court of Appeals,
in the instant case, means to qualify or cast any doubt on
the favored driver's right to rely on the above assumption,
in the ordinary case where his view is unobscured, and he
has no other warning of possible danger. Probably the
Court of Appeals is merely reiterating what has long been
the rule, and saying that where the favored driver acquires
knowledge of danger, he is bound to exercise the care of
an ordinarily prudent person; 5 that where his view is
obscured, or he has other warning of danger, he must use
a degree of care commensurate with the greater danger,
and proceed with caution; that he cannot proceed blindly
through an intersection, in disregard of obvious indications
of danger, and in disregard of the rights of those who may
be lawfully within the intersection. The question which
seems still to need an unequivocal answer is whether this
increased duty of care on the favored driver's part can be
extended to make him negligent when he collides with a
person who is clearly and undeniably unlawfully within the
intersection.
THE EFFECT OF A PLEA OF JUSTIFICATION
IN A LIBEL SUIT
Domchick v. Greenbelt Consumer Services'
Employee, plaintiff, brought a libel suit against his cor-
porate employer and its general manager, defendants, in
the Circuit Court for Prince George's County. The plaintiff-
appellant was discharged for misconduct while being em-
ployed in the defendant-appellee's food store in the meat
department. The general manager of the defendant corpor-
ation set forth the incidents of misconduct in letters to the
plaintiff and in memoranda to the directors of the corpora-
tion. Judgment was entered for the defendants at the close
of the plaintiff's case, on their motions for directed verdicts,
and the plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals held that
the testimony as to publication, even if privileged, plus the
republication of the alleged libelous material in the defen-
dant's plea of justification made out a prima facie case of
25 BLAsHTELD, op. cit., 8upra, n. 9, §1028, p. 307.
187 A. 2d 831 (Md., 1952).
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publication with malice, and, therefore, the case should not
have been taken from the jury. The court thereupon re-
versed the lower court and remanded the case for a new
trial, summarizing the law in part as follows:2
"The testimony as to the publication, even if privi-
leged, plus the republication in the plea, makes out a
prima facie case of publication with malice. Proof of
a publication not shown to be privileged infers malice,
and is sufficient to require testimony in rebuttal. It
cannot be taken from the jury at the close of the plain-
tiff's evidence."
The special plea of justification has always been a haz-
ardous' one in Maryland, but the instant case has practically
made such a plea prohibitive.
The Court of Appeals in reaching its decision, reviewed
those cases in Maryland which dealt with the effect of a
plea of justification after all the evidence had been con-
sidered and the plea had failed to be sustained.4 They
clearly established the rule that under such circumstances,
a plea of justification, if not sustained, is evidence of malice."
The court also considered a case in Maryland dealing with
a plea of justification joined with a general issue plea.s Here
a directed verdict was not allowed at the end of the plain-
tiff's evidence, since such evidence showed actual malice.
In the Domchick case not only was there a plea of justifi-
cation but also a general issue plea setting forth privilege.
Corpus Juris Secundum,7 in discussing the problem, says:
"While there is some authority holding that an un-
successful plea of justification may not be considered
2 Ibid, 837.
a PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS (1941), Ch. 17, §95, p. 856.
'Rigden v. Wolcott, 6 G. & J. 413, 419 (Md., 1834) ; Blumhardt v. Rohr,
70 Md. 328, 342, 17 A. 266, 270 (1889) ; McBee v. Fulton, 47 Md. 403, 427
(1878) ; Coffin v. Brown, 94 Md. 190, 50 A. 567, 570 (1901) ; Bowie v. Evening
News Co., 151 Md. 285, 288-289, 293, 124 A. 214 (1926).
5 In Coffin v. Brown, ibid, 200, the Court states:
"If, on the other hand, when the party is brought into court to answer
a charge of libel he undertakes to meet it by placing on the public records
the allegation that what he published was in fact true, and then utterly
fails to establish it, why should not he be held responsible for it?"
Emphasis added.
And Blumhardt v. Rohr, ibid, 342, says:
"... the appellant had by plea asserted the truth of the charge his
language imputed; and if untrue, as the jury found it to be, it was a
reassertion of the slander, and, connected with other circumstances
suggestive of malice, it could be considered as some evidence of malice."6 Deckelman v. Lake, 149 Md. 533, 131 A. 762, 765 (1926).
7 53 C. J. S. 229, "Libel and Slander", Sec. 144. Emphasis added.
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an aggravation of damages, and that such plea is not
admissible as a republication to enhance damages, as
by showing malice, in the absence of constitutional or
statutory provision to the contrary, the general rule is
that, where the truth is pleaded in justification, failure
to sustain the plea by proof may be considered by the
jury as an aggravating circumstance in estimating dam-
ages where it has no reasonable evidence to support it.
The jury should be guided by the motive with which
the plea is made, and if it is interposed in good faith,
under an honest belief in the truth of the matter pub-
lished and with reasonable grounds for such belief, it
cannot be regarded as an aggravation beyond the real
injury sustained by the plaintiff. Indeed, it has even
been held that if a plea of justification is made in good
faith, and evidence is introduced honestly, for the pur-
pose of supporting it, such evidence should be con-
sidered by the jury in mitigation of damages, although
it is insufficient to prove the truth of the plea.
The pleading of the truth of the charge,... does not
remove the qualified privilege from the communica-
tion."
Apparently former Chief Judge Marbury believed that
the moment the defendant filed a special plea of justification
instead of being content with a general issue plea, a prima
facie case of malice was raised as to the original publication.
The defendant then must substantiate his plea with evi-
dence sufficient to go to the Jury. Plaintiff's recovery
hinged on defeating the qualified privilege of the original
publication and this could only be done by the plaintiff
showing malice. The lower court saw no malice, or even the
possibility of it, because at the close of the plaintiff's case, it
directed a verdict for the defendant. In this respect it is
interesting to note the language used in the appellant's
brief.
"In granting the motion for a directed verdict as to
the defendant corporation and the defendant Ashelman,
it must be assumed that the lower court determined as
a matter of law that there was no evidence of express
malice on their parts, since statements made malici-
ously would not be privileged.
Chief Judge Marbury, who wrote the opinion in the instant case, retired
from the Court of Appeals in August of 1952.
9 No. 158, Oct. Term, 1951, p. 20.
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Before a prayer for a directed verdict can be granted,
the court must assume the truth of all the evidence
tending to sustain the suit and of all inferences of fact
fairly deductible from it, even though such evidence
may be contradicted in every particular by the opposing
evidence in the case."'10
It has been held elsewhere" that the mere fact that a
plea of justification is filed in a libel suit is not alone evi-
dence of malice sufficient to go to the jury.12 According to
such authority, a person may have a finding in his favor
under a plea of privilege irrespective of a plea of justifica-
tion since such privilege is not thereby waived."3
Those jurisdictions which have considered cases wherein
there has been a plea of privilege as well as a plea of justifi-
cation in a libel suit have held, as is set out by the Supreme
Court of Colorado in Hoover et al. v. Jordan4 which is
almost identical to the Domchick case, as follows:
"If the plaintiff in any case, where it has been deter-
mined that the communication was privileged, either
absolute or qualified, has not produced any evidence of
malice, the court should direct verdict for the defen-
dant, even though it is conclusively shown that the
matter in the communication was false.
It is contended . . .that conceding the law as to
qualified privileged communications, in this instance
such privilege was removed by excessive publication
and unnecessary promulgation; and that the pleading
of the truth of the charge in the answer ... was suffi-
cient evidence of malice to justify the court in sub-
mitting the matter to the jury.... The pleading of the
truth of the charge was not of itself evidence of malice,
nor did it remove the qualified privilege from the com-
munication. 5 ... The complaint and the testimony of
the plaintiff clearly establish that the communication
was a qualified privileged communication, and disclose
that there was some reason and excuse for the charges
made, and the testimony and all of the evidence of the
plaintiff fail utterly to show any malice on the part of
defendants; the evidence of the defendants show more
"0 Development Co. v. Houston, 179 Md. 441, 445, 19 A. 2d 706 (1941).
N NEWFLL, SLANDER AMD Lim (4th ed., 1924), 333.
'2 Scott-Burr Stores Corp. v. Edgar, 181 Miss. 486, 177 So. 766 (1938).
"Lamb v. Fedderwitz, 72 Ga. App. 406,33 S. E. 2d 839 (1945).
" 27 Colo. App. 515, 150 P. 333, 334-336 (1915).
"Citing Decker v. Gaylord, 35 Hun. 584 (N. Y., 1885).
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clearly the same thing; and, if the defendants had
moved for a direct verdict, at the close of their case,
the court should have sustained it.
The mere plea of the truth of the charge did not
authorize a verdict for the plaintiff in case the defen-
dants failed to prove it. This is a correct rule in ordi-
nary cases of libel and slander, but not in the case of a
privileged communication, either qualified or absolute.
In such cases the burden is upon the plaintiff, assum-
ing the falsity of the charge, to prove actual malice on
part of defendant, before a recovery can be had."'"
As the present law of Maryland now stands, if the defen-
dant wishes to plead the truth of the charge made, as well
as the privilege, not only does he have to prove the privilege,
but also must prove the truth. The question of the truth
is for the jury to decide. This means that the defendant
would not be entitled to a directed verdict at the end of
the plaintiff's evidence.
12 Citing Denver Public Warehouse Co. v. Holloway, 34 Colo. 432, 83 P. 131
(1905).
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